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
**INSTITUTIONS FOR ENSURING BENEFITS TO MOTIVATE  
CIVIL SERVANTS IN VIETNAM**

**ABSTRACT OF DOCTORAL THESIS  
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*Come on.... hours..., days... month... in 2026*

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## INTRODUCTION

### **1. Rationale of the Study**

Work motivation is a crucial factor determining the effectiveness of the civil service system. Although Vietnam has implemented numerous reforms of civil service institutions to improve the quality and effectiveness of public administration, such phenomena as working perfunctorily, avoiding responsibility, fear of making mistakes, and limited innovation still persist. This reality suggests that current reforms have not yet generated strong and sustainable work motivation among civil servants.

Previous studies have mainly examined civil servants' motivation from the perspectives of psychology and human resource management, focusing on factors such as needs, salaries, rewards, and working conditions. However, they have not sufficiently explained the role of institutions in shaping civil servants' expectations and work motivation. From an institutional political economy perspective, work motivation depends not only on the benefits civil servants receive but also on their expectations regarding future benefits.

In this context, studying institutions for ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants is of both theoretical and practical significance. It helps clarify the mechanisms through which institutions influence civil servants' work motivation and provides a scientific basis for improving civil service institutions in Vietnam.

### **2. Research Objectives and Tasks**

The dissertation aims to clarify the scientific foundations of

institutions ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants, thereby proposing orientations for improving such institutions in Vietnam.

To achieve this objective, the dissertation undertakes the following tasks: (i) reviewing the existing literature and identifying research gaps; (ii) developing a theoretical framework on institutions ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants; (iii) analyzing and evaluating the current status of such institutions in Vietnam; and (iv) proposing viewpoints and solutions for institutional improvement in the coming period.

### **3. Research Object and Scope**

The dissertation examines institutions for ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants and the mechanisms through which these institutions influence work motivation.

The study focuses on civil servants working within Vietnam's state administrative system. The research content covers institutions ensuring material benefits, career development benefits, non-material benefits, and public values. The primary period of analysis is from 2011 to 2025.

### **4. Theoretical Foundations, Research Methods, and Analytical Framework**

The dissertation is grounded in the methodology of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and Marxist–Leninist political economy theories on interests and interest relations. It also selectively draws upon institutional theory, expectancy theory, equity theory, and studies on motivation among civil servants.

The main research methods employed include scientific abstraction, analysis and synthesis, statistical analysis, comparative

analysis, document analysis, and historical analysis.

The analytical framework is developed from an institutional political economy perspective, which views civil servants' work motivation as the outcome of mechanisms for allocating and ensuring benefits within the public sector. Civil servants are regarded as actors operating within a system of interest relations and institutional constraints. Accordingly, institutions influence work motivation not directly, but through the formation of expected benefits based on institutionally guaranteed benefits and institutional credibility. The causal chain is analyzed as follows: Institutions → Institutionally Guaranteed Benefits and Institutional Credibility → Expected Benefits → Work Motivation.

### **5. Research Questions**

To achieve the research objectives, the dissertation addresses the following key questions:

(1) What are institutions for ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants, and what are their core components?

(2) Through what mechanisms do institutions influence civil servants' work motivation?

(3) What is the current status of institutions ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants in Vietnam, and what are their major achievements, limitations, and causes?

(4) What viewpoints and solutions should be adopted to improve institutions ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants in Vietnam in the coming period?

### **6. Analytical Proposition**

Based on the synthesis of relevant theories and the analytical

framework, the dissertation proposes the following analytical propositions:

Proposition 1 (M1). The degree of institutional development in safeguarding benefits positively influences both the realization of those benefits and institutional credibility.

Proposition 2 (M2). Institutionally guaranteed benefits and institutional credibility have a positive influence on the formation of civil servants' expected benefits.

Proposition 3 (M3). Expected benefits have a positive effect on civil servants' work motivation.

Proposition 4 (M4). A decline in work motivation increases the tendency toward defensive behavior in the performance of public duties.

## **7. Research Approach**

The dissertation approaches civil servants' work motivation from an institutional political economy perspective. Accordingly, civil servants are viewed as actors operating within a system of interest relations and institutional constraints, while work motivation is formed through the interaction among interests, expectations, and the institutional environment. This approach enables the analysis of work motivation not only from the individual perspective but also from the perspective of institutional structures and benefit allocation mechanisms within the public sector.

## **8. Theoretical and Practical Contributions**

*Theoretically*, the dissertation contributes to the literature on civil servants' work motivation by approaching the issue from the perspective of the political economy of institutions. It highlights the

importance of institutional factors in shaping civil servants' work motivation and enriches existing studies that have primarily focused on psychological, organizational, and managerial explanations.

*Practically*, the dissertation contributes to improving civil service institutions in Vietnam by emphasizing not only the formulation of policies but also the capacity of institutions to create a credible relationship between effort, performance, and benefits within the civil service. By highlighting the link between institutions and their implementation, the dissertation also helps identify institutional bottlenecks that constrain the effectiveness of the public sector.

## **9. Novel Contributions in Terms of Approach and Methodology**

### *Theoretical Contributions*

*First*, the dissertation approaches civil servants' work motivation from the perspective of the political economy of institutions. In doing so, it extends existing explanations of public service motivation beyond psychological factors, organizational behavior, and public management by emphasizing the role of institutional arrangements in the allocation and protection of interests.

*Second*, the dissertation proposes an analytical framework for explaining the mechanism through which institutions influence civil servants' work motivation, following the logical sequence: Institutions → Institutionally Guaranteed Benefits and Institutional Credibility → Expected Benefits → Work Motivation. This framework contributes to clarifying the role of institutional factors in shaping civil servants' work motivation from a political economy perspective.

*Third*, the dissertation clarifies the role of expected benefits in the formation of civil servants' work motivation. Based on this perspective, it demonstrates that the influence of institutions on work motivation is not direct, but operates through the transformation of institutionally guaranteed benefits into expected benefits.

#### ***Practical Contributions***

*Fourth*, based on an analysis of Vietnam's civil service institutions, the dissertation demonstrates that the limitations in motivating civil servants stem not primarily from an insufficient provision of institutionally guaranteed benefits, but from the gap between institutionally guaranteed benefits and the expected benefits perceived by civil servants. This gap reflects shortcomings in the appropriateness, fairness, transparency, consistency, and predictability of institutions for ensuring benefits, which undermine institutional credibility and, consequently, weaken civil servants' work motivation.

### **10. Structure of the Dissertation**

In addition to the Introduction, Conclusion, List of Publications, References, and Appendices, the dissertation consists of four chapters:

Chapter 1. Literature Review.

Chapter 2. Theoretical and Practical Issues of Institutions for Ensuring Benefits to Motivate Civil Servants

Chapter 3. Current Status of Institutions for Ensuring Benefits to Motivate Civil Servants

Chapter 4. Viewpoints and Solutions for Institutions for Ensuring Benefits to Motivate Civil Servants

## CHAPTER 1

### OVERVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES

#### 1.1. OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES

International studies have examined civil servants' work motivation from various perspectives.

(i) Studies on interests and institutions (Marx, North, Stigler, Peltzman) argue that individuals' behavior is shaped by interest structures and institutional rules.

(ii) Studies on work motivation (Maslow, Herzberg, Vroom, Adams) emphasize the roles of needs, expectations, fairness, and incentive mechanisms in motivating behavior.

(iii) Studies on Public Service Motivation (PSM) (Perry & Wise, Vandenberg) contend that civil servants' motivation derives not only from material benefits but also from public values and a commitment to serving society.

(iv) Studies on institutions and civil service behavior (North, Scott, March & Olsen, Jensen & Meckling, Moe) demonstrate that institutions shape civil servants' expectations, behavior, and accountability through mechanisms of supervision, incentives, and oversight.

(v) Studies on modern civil service institutions (OECD, World Bank, and research on New Public Management (NPM), New Public Service (NPS), and New Public Governance (NPG)) highlight the importance of compensation, career development, performance evaluation, and power control in sustaining civil servants' work motivation.

Domestic studies have mainly focused on factors influencing civil servants' work motivation, including salaries, income, working conditions, promotion opportunities, training, performance evaluation, and organizational fairness. Some studies have also addressed the roles of institutions, power control, and accountability in shaping civil service behavior. These studies provide important practical insights for civil service and administrative reforms in Vietnam. However, most of them approach the issue from the perspectives of human resource management, organizational behavior, or public administration.

## **1.2. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND RESEARCH GAPS**

The dissertation builds upon theories of interests, institutions, work motivation, public service motivation, and modern public governance in examining civil servants' motivation. However, in the context of Vietnamese civil servants, these issues have not been systematically investigated from an institutional political economy perspective. Specifically:

First, previous studies have not clearly explained the mechanisms through which institutions shape civil servants' expectations and behavior.

Second, insufficient attention has been paid to the roles of institutional credibility and mechanisms for protecting civil servants in influencing work motivation.

Third, the process through which institutionally guaranteed benefits are transformed into expected benefits and work motivation has not been adequately explained.

**CHAPTER 2**  
**THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES OF**  
**INSTITUTIONS FOR ENSURING BENEFITS TO MOTIVATE**  
**CIVIL SERVANTS**

**2.1. CONCEPTS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND ROLES OF**  
**INSTITUTIONS FOR ENSURING BENEFITS TO MOTIVATE CIVIL**  
**SERVANTS**

**2.1.1. Concepts**

Civil servants are actors who directly exercise state authority within state administrative agencies. They are governed by civil service institutions and receive benefits primarily through state allocation mechanisms. Their behavior and work motivation are influenced not only by individual factors but also by the institutional environment of the civil service system.

Civil servants' benefits refer to the realization of material, non-material, and career-related benefits through socio-economic relations and state distribution mechanisms. These benefits include salaries, income, welfare, promotion opportunities, recognition, social status, and realizing public values.

Work motivation among civil servants is defined as the willingness and commitment to invest their competence, effort, and responsibility in performing public duties.

Institutions are understood as a system of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement mechanisms that shape the expectations and behavior of actors. Within the scope of this dissertation, institutions are not understood as being synonymous with laws, policies, or individual administrative regulations. Rather, they also include

professional norms, civil service culture, institutional credibility, and behavioral rules that shape civil servants' work motivation.

Institutions for ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants are the comprehensive system of rules, norms, and enforcement mechanisms established or recognized by the Party and the State to establish, allocate, protect, and realize the material, nonmaterial, career-related, and public-value benefits of civil servants

Institutional credibility reflects the extent to which civil servants believe that institutional rules, commitments, and benefit-guaranteeing mechanisms will be translated into the benefits they genuinely expect to obtain. Institutional credibility is primarily reflected in the fairness, transparency, consistency in implementation, and predictability of institutions.

Expected benefits refer to the extent to which civil servants believe that their competence, effort, and performance in carrying out public duties will be translated into commensurate benefits within a given institutional environment. Expected benefits are formed on the basis of institutionally guaranteed benefits and the level of institutional credibility. Unlike actual benefits received, expected benefits reflect civil servants' reasonable anticipation of the benefits they may obtain in the present or future. They serve as the intermediate link between institutions and work motivation.

Defensive behavior refers to the tendency to choose low-risk approaches to performing public duties in order to minimize personal responsibility under conditions of institutional uncertainty. It is manifested in excessive procedural caution, avoidance of responsibility, shifting tasks to others, and reluctance to innovate.

### **2.1.2. Characteristics and Roles of Institutions for Ensuring Benefits to Motivate Civil Servants**

Institutions ensuring benefits for civil servants' work motivation exhibit three fundamental characteristics: (1) benefit orientation; (2) Expectation forming; and (3) dependence on institutional credibility.

These institutions perform five key roles: (1) guiding civil servants' official conduct; (2) creating expected benefits and fostering work motivation; (3) safeguarding the legitimate interests of civil servants; (4) promoting coordination and improving collective performance; and (5) managing risks and regulating conflicts of interest.

## **2.2. CONTENTS, EVALUATION CRITERIA, AND INFLUENCING FACTORS**

### **2.2.1. Main Contents**

Drawing on studies of work motivation, motivation among civil servants, and institutional theory, the dissertation identifies three major dimensions of institutions for ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants.

First, institutions ensuring material benefits. These include regulations on salaries, allowances, and welfare benefits. They provide a minimum level of benefits, satisfy basic needs, and reduce occupational uncertainty.

Second, institutions ensuring career development based on competence. These include position-based human resource management, performance evaluation, training, and promotion systems. Such mechanisms enable civil servants to transform competence and job performance into future career benefits.

Third, institutions ensuring non-material benefits and public values. These include regulations concerning public values, accountability, transparency, power control, rewards, recognition of achievements, and the protection of civil servants who properly perform their duties. They provide the foundation for strengthening institutional credibility and work motivation among civil servants.

### **2.2.2. Evaluation Criteria**

The dissertation develops five criteria:

(1) **Relevance:** the extent to which institutions safeguard the legitimate interests of civil servants and guide behavior consistent with civil service objectives.

(2) **Fairness:** the degree of correspondence between competence, performance, public responsibility, and the benefits received. A lack of fairness undermines trust, weakens motivation, and increases defensive behavior.

(3) **Transparency:** the clarity, openness, and accessibility of regulations, standards, procedures, and benefit-guaranteeing mechanisms. Transparency strengthens both expected benefits and trust in institutions.

(4) **Consistency:** the extent to which institutional rules and benefit-guaranteeing mechanisms are applied uniformly, stably, and without arbitrariness. Consistent implementation enables civil servants to trust that competence and performance will be recognized according to common principles.

(5) **Stability and predictability:** the degree to which institutional rules remain stable and enable civil servants to anticipate the relationship between effort, job performance, and future benefits.

### **2.2.3. Influencing Factors**

The dissertation identifies six major groups of factors influencing the formation, operation, and improvement of institutions for ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants: historical and cultural factors; political factors; public governance models; economic conditions; institutional design and implementation capacity; and international integration requirements.

### **2.3. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

The dissertation examines the experiences of five countries:

(1) Singapore: establishing strong links between competence, performance, and rewards, thereby enhancing fairness, transparency, and work motivation.

(2) Japan: combining employment stability, long-term capacity development, and a strong emphasis on responsibility and integrity to sustain motivation.

(3) South Korea: promoting work motivation through competence- and performance-based management, while strengthening transparency, accountability, and technology application in public governance.

(4) Australia: developing a civil service system based on performance management, capability development, and public values, thereby balancing material incentives and motivation among civil servants.

(5) China: combining material benefits, career development opportunities, and strengthened discipline and power control to promote motivation associated with public responsibility.

Overall, these countries seek to establish a close relationship between competence, job performance, and rewards, thereby

strengthening institutional credibility and work motivation among civil servants.

Based on these experiences, the dissertation draws six lessons for Vietnam:

1. Shift from a rule-oriented approach to an incentive-structure design approach.
2. Enhance institutional credibility through transparency, fairness, and predictability.
3. Harmonize interest relations within the public sector.
4. Develop public sector human resource management based on competence and performance.
5. Combine material incentives with non-material and public service motivation.
6. Implement civil service reforms in a consistent and long-term manner.

### **CHAPTER 3**

#### **THE CURRENT STATUS OF INSTITUTIONS FOR ENSURING BENEFITS TO MOTIVATE CIVIL SERVANTS IN VIETNAM**

##### **3.1. CURRENT STATUS OF INSTITUTIONS ENSURING MATERIAL BENEFITS TO MOTIVATE CIVIL SERVANTS**

During the period 2011–2025, institutions ensuring material benefits for civil servants in Vietnam underwent significant improvements. The salary system was gradually adjusted to increase income, strengthen social security, and enhance career stability; the allowance system became more diversified to reflect working

conditions, responsibilities, and occupational characteristics; welfare policies relating to social insurance, health insurance, and living conditions were expanded; and financial autonomy mechanisms were strengthened, creating additional opportunities to improve civil servants' income. These changes contributed to enhancing material benefits, strengthening civil servants' confidence in the State's reform commitments, and maintaining the stability of the civil service workforce.

However, the motivational effectiveness of institutions ensuring material benefits remains limited. Salaries have not yet become the primary source of income sufficient to ensure an adequate standard of living for civil servants. Salary determination continues to rely largely on rank, grade, and seniority, while the implementation of position-, competence-, and performance-based pay remains slow. Income disparities between the public and private sectors remain substantial, particularly in economically developed areas, reducing the competitiveness of the public sector in attracting and retaining highly qualified personnel. In addition, the allowance system remains fragmented and complex, while welfare policies mainly focus on basic social protection rather than serving as strategic instruments for motivation, workforce development, and talent retention.

These limitations stem from multiple factors. Economic conditions, labor productivity, fiscal constraints, and the large size of the publicly funded workforce limit resources available for salary reform. Institutional shortcomings persist in human resource databases, job valuation systems, performance measurement, and results-based management. Moreover, a comprehensive strategy for

compensation and welfare has yet to be established. In implementation, egalitarian practices, limitations in performance evaluation, and the existence of certain informal benefits reduce the effectiveness of material incentive mechanisms.

Overall, the core limitation of institutions ensuring material benefits lies not merely in the relatively low level of benefits but in the failure to establish a sufficiently strong link between competence, job performance, and the benefits received by civil servants. This weakens institutional credibility, limits the formation of expected benefits, and adversely affects work motivation, talent attraction, and the effectiveness of the civil service system.

### **3.2. CURRENT STATUS OF INSTITUTIONS ENSURING COMPETENCE-BASED CAREER DEVELOPMENT AMONG CIVIL SERVANTS**

During the period 2011–2025, institutions supporting competence-based career development for civil servants in Vietnam were significantly improved toward a public sector human resource management model based on position-based management, competence and performance. Competence has gradually become a central criterion in recruitment, deployment, evaluation, training, and promotion. The position-based system has been implemented nationwide; performance evaluation has gradually shifted from administrative assessment to results-based assessment; promotion mechanisms increasingly emphasize competence and accountability; training programs have been oriented toward job-position requirements; policies for talent attraction have received greater attention.

These reforms have expanded career development opportunities and strengthened expectations that competence and achievements will be recognized within the civil service system.

Nevertheless, a considerable gap remains between policy objectives and implementation. The position-based system has not yet become the central foundation of the public sector human resource management cycle. Linkages between the position-based system and recruitment, evaluation, training, remuneration, personnel planning, and promotion remain weak. Performance evaluation continues to exhibit egalitarian tendencies, while evaluation results are not effectively utilized in career development, rewards, training, or promotion. Promotion mechanisms still rely heavily on traditional administrative procedures, competitive recruitment remains limited, and post-promotion evaluation lacks clear output- and accountability-based indicators.

Training and professional development programs, despite their large scale, remain insufficiently aligned with competence requirements and the demands of modern public administration. Training content has been slow to incorporate emerging competencies such as digital transformation, data governance, and innovation. Furthermore, talent attraction and retention policies have not yet generated sufficient advantages in terms of income, working conditions, and career prospects compared with the private sector.

These limitations arise from both institutional and implementation factors. The transition from a traditional career-based civil service system to a competence- and performance-based model has been slow. Performance management systems, personnel databases, and

evidence-based management tools remain underdeveloped, while personnel decentralization and accountability mechanisms are not yet fully synchronized. At the same time, organizational cultural norms emphasizing seniority, stability, and limited competition continue to influence personnel management practices.

Overall, the core limitation of competence-based career development institutions lies not in the absence of regulations but in the failure to establish a clear, consistent, and credibility worthy relationship between competence, job performance, and career advancement opportunities. This weakens institutional credibility, reduces expected benefits from investments in competence and performance, and negatively affects learning motivation, innovation, professional development, and talent retention.

### **3.3. CURRENT STATUS OF INSTITUTIONS ENSURING NON-MATERIAL BENEFITS AND PUBLIC VALUES**

During the period 2011–2025, institutions ensuring non-material benefits and public values for civil servants in Vietnam experienced significant improvements. Reward and commendation systems were gradually reformed toward diversified forms of recognition that combine material rewards, non-material incentives, and career development opportunities. Mechanisms for protecting civil servants in the performance of public duties were gradually established. At the same time, public values such as integrity, responsibility, serving the people, fairness, and the rule of law were increasingly institutionalized through legal regulations, civil service ethics, civil service culture, and exemplary leadership requirements.

Institutions safeguarding public values were further strengthened

through improvements in accountability mechanisms, conflict-of-interest control, power control, and anti-corruption measures. These reforms contributed to greater transparency, accountability, and integrity in public administration while reinforcing work motivation among civil servants and confidence in public values.

However, the motivational effectiveness of these institutions remains limited. Reward mechanisms are not sufficiently linked to actual outputs and substantive contributions; achievement assessment still lacks objective criteria and adequate fairness; and the material value of many rewards remains too low to encourage innovation and improve performance.

In addition, mechanisms for protecting civil servants in the performance of their duties remain inadequate. The distinction between objective risks, professional errors, and violations of public responsibility remains unclear, while protection mechanisms for civil servants acting lawfully are neither sufficiently stable nor consistent. Under increasing power-control and accountability requirements, many civil servants tend to adopt risk-averse behavior or avoid responsibility in order to minimize occupational risks.

The transformation of public values into work motivation also remains limited. A gap persists between the public values emphasized in policy and actual administrative practice, while mechanisms for recognizing, protecting, and encouraging behavior serving the public interest remain insufficiently strong to generate sustainable intrinsic motivation.

These limitations stem from both institutional and implementation factors. Mechanisms for power control and anti-corruption have

developed more rapidly than mechanisms for encouraging and protecting civil servants, while changes in organizational culture and civil service norms have lagged behind formal institutional reforms. Consequently, trust in recognition and protection mechanisms has weakened, limiting the transformation of non-material benefits into expected benefits.

Overall, the core limitation of institutions ensuring non-material benefits and public values lies not in the absence of regulations but in the failure to establish a sufficiently clear and trustworthy connection between behavior serving the public interest and its recognition, protection, and rewarding in practice. As a result, public values have not been fully transformed into expected benefits and work motivation, while defensive and risk-averse behavior has become more prevalent in civil service performance.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVING INSTITUTIONS FOR ENSURING BENEFITS TO MOTIVATE CIVIL SERVANTS IN VIETNAM**

#### **4.1. CONTEXT AND REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENT**

Both international and domestic developments are creating new demands on the civil service system and the civil service workforce. The Fourth Industrial Revolution, digital transformation, strategic competition among major powers, climate change, and non-traditional security challenges have increased uncertainty in the development environment, while making institutional quality,

governance capacity, and high-quality human resources key determinants of national competitiveness.

For Vietnam, the requirements of growth model transformation, building a socialist rule-of-law state, accelerating digital transformation, streamlining the state apparatus, and improving national governance have placed increasing pressure on civil servants. In this context, improving civil service institutions to better safeguard the legitimate interests of civil servants, align responsibilities with benefits, encourage innovation, and strengthen work motivation is not only a requirement of public sector human resource management but also a prerequisite for improving institutional implementation, governance effectiveness, and national competitiveness in the new development stage.

#### **4.2. VIEWPOINTS ON IMPROVING INSTITUTIONS FOR ENSURING BENEFITS TO MOTIVATE CIVIL SERVANTS IN VIETNAM**

Based on the theoretical framework developed in the dissertation and the findings presented in Chapter 3, institutional improvement should be guided by three fundamental viewpoints:

(1) Improving institutions toward a civil service management model based on competence, job performance, and public responsibility, while strengthening the linkage among effort, performance, and benefits.

(2) Improving institutional quality through strengthening institutional credibility. Institutional reform should go beyond improving formal regulations and should aim to enhance the appropriateness, transparency, fairness, consistency, and predictability of institutional arrangements.

(3) Building a civil service incentive system grounded in institutional credibility, harmoniously combining material benefits, non-material benefits, and public values, while balancing power control with the maintenance of legitimate work motivation.

#### **4.3. SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVING INSTITUTIONS FOR ENSURING BENEFITS TO MOTIVATE CIVIL SERVANTS**

First, improving institutions ensuring material benefits. Salary policies should continue to be reformed to provide a standard of living consistent with civil service requirements and gradually narrow the gap between the public and private sectors, particularly for positions requiring high professional qualifications. At the same time, remuneration should be more closely linked to job performance and task accomplishment.

In addition, welfare policies, working conditions, and support mechanisms should be further improved to enhance civil servants' sense of career security.

Second, improving institutions supporting competence-based career development. Institutions governing position-based human resource management, recruitment, evaluation, training, deployment, and promotion should continue to be refined on the basis of competence and performance. Performance evaluation should be made more substantive so that evaluation results become an important basis for personnel deployment, training, promotion, and career development. Furthermore, a transparent, fair, and competitive environment should be established to ensure equal access to career advancement opportunities.

Third, improving institutions for ensuring non material benefits,

promoting public values, and strengthening institutional credibility. This perspective emphasizes the development of mechanisms for recognizing and honoring achievements, encouraging innovation and creativity, and fostering public service values in civil service activities. It also requires improving mechanisms to protect civil servants who properly perform their legally assigned duties and responsibilities, thereby reducing responsibility-avoidance, risk-averse attitudes, and defensive behavior in the implementation of public duties.

Fourth, improving power-control mechanisms in conjunction with work motivation. The effectiveness of inspection, supervision, and anti-corruption measures should be enhanced while maintaining an appropriate balance between power control and the need to sustain work motivation and encourage innovation in the public sector. Accountability, transparency, and sanctioning mechanisms should be improved in a fair, consistent, and trust-building manner.

#### **4.4 CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION**

To ensure the effectiveness of these solutions, institutional reform in the civil service sector must be implemented in a coordinated manner with salary reform, administrative reform, digital transformation, and the development of a socialist rule-of-law state. In addition, institutional implementation capacity and the accountability of civil service management agencies should be strengthened.

Building upon the theoretical foundations clarified in Chapter 2 and the empirical findings presented in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 proposes a system of viewpoints and solutions for improving institutions for ensuring benefits to motivate civil servants in Vietnam. These solutions aim to strengthen the linkage between

effort, job performance, and attainable benefits while enhancing the transparency, stability, and trustworthiness of the institutional environment. Their effective implementation will contribute to strengthening work motivation, improving the quality of the civil service workforce, and enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the civil service system in the new development stage.

## CONCLUSION

The dissertation finds that civil servants' work motivation is not merely the result of psychological factors or isolated human resource management instruments but also the outcome of the institutional structure governing benefits within the public sector.

By analyzing the relationships among institutions, expected benefits, motivation, and civil service behavior, the dissertation clarifies the mechanisms through which institutions influence civil servants' work motivation. The Vietnamese experience shows that the major limitations do not stem from the absence of formally guaranteed benefits but from the weak linkage between effort, job performance, and the benefits that civil servants expect to obtain.

### **Directions for Future Research**

Due to limitations in scope, the dissertation focuses primarily on civil servants within the state administrative system. Future studies may extend the analysis to public employees, managerial and leadership officials, or undertake quantitative research on the effects of different institutions on work motivation.

**LIST OF PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO THE  
DISSERTATION**

1. Nguyen Thi Kim Hue (2025), Competence-Based Civil Service Management: Current Challenges and Solutions, Political Theory Journal, February 2025 Issue.
2. Nguyen Thi Kim Hue (2025), Singapore's Experience in Building a Professional Civil Service Workforce, Political Theory Journal, April 2025 Issue.
3. Nguyen Thi Kim Hue (2025), Singapore's Experience in Motivating Civil Servants and Implications for Vietnam, Political Theory Journal, May 2025 Issue.
4. Nguyen Thi Kim Hue (2025), Performance-Based Pay in the Public Sector: International Experience and Implications for Vietnam, Labour and Social Affairs Journal, No. 735, March 2025.

